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254 KESLER '!J. PABST 
The motion to dismiss 
to the Board of Governors 
and 
the commission of the offense 
Hallinan \vas convicted involved moral 
or other misconduct disbarment 
suspension. 
Shenk, and concurred. 
did not herein. 
F. No. 18997. In Bank. 
BER'l'HA KESLER et 
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Per-
sonal Injury.-In absence of agreement to 
of action for to either husband or wife 
are 
property, and it is necessary to 
of one spouse to the other to prevent ne::;ll£~en 
profiting his own wrong. 
[2] !d.-Actions-Defenses-Husband's Contributory 
-Where husband and wife sustained 
to 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
Community Property, § 36. 
McK. Dig. References: 
Husband and § 189 
interest in her 
to exercise control 
action and cannot 





Id.- Actions- Defenses- Husband's Contributory Negli-
gence.---\Vhere wife did not secure entire interest in her cause 
action for personal injuries occurrence of events beyond 
husband's control, but secured if at all, only because 
relinquished it to reason for rule imputing 
to hrr has not eeased to exist, and he is unjustly 
his wife her full recovery. 
APPBAI1 from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
}fateo Affirmed. 
~\ction by husband and wife for damages for personal in-
arising out of collision of vehicles. Judgment for de-
f('ndant aflirrnrd. 
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It is unnecessary to determine rule of 
of causes of 
ders ineffective a 
such a cause of action executed cause of action has 
arisen. Perkins v. Suuset & Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 
71H-ni [10:5 P. 190].) BJYPll if it is assumed that such 
a relinquishment is effee.tive bcti\'een the spouses, its execution 
does not the husband from profiting by his 
own wrong. his act of Mr. Kesler sought 
to exercise control oyer his interest in the community cause 
of action and up his in the recovery. The right 
to dispose of constitutes a major interest 
of the owner the exercise of such right the 
owner could avoid of his contributory negligence 
and thus create an enforceable in his donee that did not 
theretofore exist, he would in his own wrong. 
A.ccordingly, the of unjust enrichment 
cannot be accomplished a relinquishment of the 
negligent husband's interest to his wife. 
It is however, that the logical consequence of 
the holding in Plores v. supm, is that a negligent 
husband is not enriched his 1vife's recovery after 
he has relinquished his interest in her eause of action to her. 
In support of this contention it is urged that in that case 
the wife was allowed to recover for all of the damages suffered 
by her, although her husband's interest must have passed 
through his estate to her on his death. The argument con-
cludes that since no ust enrichment resulted in that case 
by permitting the husband's interest to pass to his wife through 
his estate, no unjust enrichment would result by allowing 
him to his interest to her directly. This contention over-
looks the peculiar character of the wife's cause of action for 
personal injuries. [3] Although it was determined in Me-
43 C.2d-9 
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Fadden v. Santa Ana etc. CaL 464 P. 11 
L.RA. , that the wife cause of action is community 
property, it remained the settled even before section 370 
of the Code of Procedure was amendC'd in 1913 to allow 
the wife to sue that the wife was a necessary party 
to the action. v. SrmtheTn Pac. 167 Cal. 786, 
790-791 [141 P. 388]. As was pointed out in the l\1 oody 
r•ase this rule was adopted at c:ommo11 law to prPvent the 
eause of action for tlw wife from on her 
husband's death. (See also Fink v. Campbell, 70 F. 664, 
667 [ 17 C.C.A. 325] ; Fowler v. Frisbie. 8 Conn. :520, 824; 
Fuller v. Naugatuck Railroad 21 Conn. 557, 573-57 4; 
Church v. Town 45 Vt. 380, 385; Horandt 
v. Central R. Co. New Jersey, 78 N.J.T~. 190 Atl. 93, 
''Although at common law the cause of action for the wife's 
suffering was the separate property of the husband, it was 
settled that the wife was a necessary party to the suit, the 
reasoning being that, as the authorities express it, she was 
the 'meritorious cause of action,' and that in case of his death 
pending suit the cause of action would survive to her .... 
The proposition that, although the right of action is commu-
nity property, yet the wife is a necessary party in this par-
ticular class of cases, is no more illogical than the rule at 
common law that the ·wife must join though the right was 
the separate property of the husband. The reasons for the 
decisions under the common law are applicable to the ease 
where the right is eommunity property, as fully and com-
pletely as to the case where it is the husband's separate prop-
erty." (Moody v. Southern Pac. Co., supm, 167 Cal. 786, 
790-791 [141 P. 388 .) [4] Thus, since on her husband's 
death, the wife's entire cause of action survives to her by oper-
ation of law, the husband cannot, either by exercising or failing 
to exercise his power of testamentary disposition over half 
of the community property, affect his wife's rights in her 
cause of action. Accordingly, he is not unjustly enriched by 
allowing his wife her full recovery. [5] In the present case, 
on the other hand, Mrs. Kesler did not secure the entire inter-
est in her cause of action by the oecnrrence of events beyond 
her husband's control; she secured it, if at all, only because he 
voluntarily relinquished it to her, and ac:eordingly, the reason 
for the rule imputing his negligenep to her hfls not ePased to 
exist. 
Amici curiae eontend that to the extent that the wife has 
been given the management and control of the damages re-
1954 KESLER v. PABST 259 
[ 43 C.2d 254; 273 P.2d 257] 
covered her for her personal injuries by section 171c* of 
the Civil Code, the husband's interest therein has become so 
attenuated that it should not be considered sufficient to justify 
his negligence to her. In the light of this statutory 
it is contended that the evil of permitting the negli-
gent defendant to escape liability is no longer outweighed 
the benefits the spouse might secure by his own 
wrong. supra, 39 Cal.2d 622, 632.) 
In this connection it is pointed out that the older cases in 
which the wife's negligence was imputed to her husband were 
decided primarily on an agency theory, and not on the theory 
that the wife's nonmanagerial interest in the community prop-
was sufficient to justify imputing negligence to prevent 
her from profiting by her own wrong. (See opinion on denial 
of hearing by the SuprE'me Court in Keena v. United Railroads 
S. F., 57 Cal.App. 124, 132 [207 P. 35] .) Since it is now 
settled that the family relationship standing alone is not suffi-
dent to convert family activities into joint enterprises, or to 
make one spouse the agent of the other, for purposes of 
imputing negligence (Flores v. Brown, supra, 39 Cal.2d 622, 
630, and cases cited), it is contended that the entire doctrine 
of imputed negligence between spouses should be re-examined 
in the light of the statutory change with respect to the right 
of management and control of damages recoverable for per-
sonal injuries. In the present case, however, the cause of 
ar.tion arose before section 171c was added to the Civil Code 
in 1951, and at a time when l\Ir. Kesler was entitled to thE' 
management and control of any damages his wife might re-
(~over. Aeeordingly, it is unnecessary to decide at this time 
*"Notwithstanding the pro•isions of Section 161a and 172 of this 
eode, and subject to the prodsions of Sections 164 and 169 of this code, 
the wife has the management, control and disposition, other than testa· 
mentary except as otherwise permitted by law, of community property 
money earned by her, or community property money damages received 
h;v her for personal injuries suffered by her, until it is commingled with 
other community property, except that the husband shall have manage-
ment, control, and disposition of such money damages to the extent 
necessary to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the wife's personal 
in,juri('s. 
''During such time as the wife may have the management, control 
and disposition of such money, as herein provided, she may not make 
a gift thereof, or dispose of the same without a minable consideration, 
without the written consent of the husband. 
''This section shall not be construed as making such money the sep-
arate property of the wife, nor as changing the respective interests of 








alone for her 
derson v. 
the recovery therefor 
erty 
Property, pp. 





of action in the wife for her 
cause of action.'' As I 
v. 88 Cal.2d 
, the wife }ws a right to sue 
(Code Civ. Proe .. § 370; San-
567 [110 P.2d 1025]), and 
should be her sole and prop-
de Funiak, Prineiples of Community 
232; 24 CaJ.I_,.Rev. 7:19, 741; Hest. 
In the I out that since the 1921 
amendment to section 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
a married lvoman may lvitl10ut l1er husband joined 
as a party in all aetions ". . those ·injury to 
her person. . . . '' and that any recovery received by her 
should, logically, be her and personal property. This 
court, however, continues to 1vithout due consideration, 
that the cause of action tbe wife's InJuries is a 
community cause of aetion and that any recoyery therefor 
should also be This holding, carried to 
the injured, wholly innocent, 
cent if her husband was guilty 
hold that since the wife 
any recovery therefor 
not constitute jndicial 
reasonable interpretation 
common ::;ense. The 
wife of a contribu-
261 
compensa-
no reason why the 
obstacle here should not be with even greater 
ease. To hold that injuries of a 
married person numerous 
injustices which for example, that 
a wife is for the loss of a leg. 
The sum recovered becomes community property 
over which the husband has controL He may dissipate it, or 
spend it unwisely. The may be dissolved, through 
death or and the wife \Yill be left without any com-
pensation for her and permanent disability. 
Presumably, however, in the situation which I have just sug-
gested this court would permit the husband to relinquish his 
share in the sum recowred to the wife if he so desired. 
In the instant case. the wife's en use of action for her injuries 
arose when the accident occurred. Thereafter, the husband 
sought to relinquish to her, written agreement, any inter-
est he might have in that cause of action. In holding that 
the negligent husband would still be profiting by his own 
wrong, a majority of this court says ''Even if it is assumed 
that such a relinquishment is effective betvveen the spouses, 
its execution does not th0 husband from 
profiting by his own ·wrong. By his act of relinquishment 
Mr. Kesler sought to exercise control over his interest in the 
community cause of action and up his rights in the re-
covery. The right to of however, constitutes 
a major interest of the owner and if by the exercise 
of such right the owner could avoid the effect of his con-
tributory negligence and thus create an enforceable right in 
his donee that did not th0retofore exist, he would in fact 
profit by his own wrong. Accordingly, the objective of pre-
venting unjust enrichment cannot be accomplished by a vol-
untary relinquishment of th0 negligent husband's interest to 
his wife.'' When this holding is considered in connection 
2G2 KERLER [ 4:1 C.2d 
with that of Flores v. Brown, 39 CaL2d 622 P.2d 922 , 
it becomes at once apparent that of this court will 
fit its law to the facts as it chooses withont 1 either 
logic or justice. 
In 1 he F'lores cast~. Mr. Flores and a son were killed. Mrs. 
I<'lores and their daughter were injured. This court refused 
10 impute thr contributory of 
wife so as to bar her reeovery for her 
their son. It was there said: "·when the ts 
hmvever, the interests in any these causes action become 
separate property. and it becomes possible to the 
elt~mcnts of damag"'s that ·would, except for the community 
property system, be considered personal to each spouse. 
Under these circumstances the objective of preventing unjust 
enrichment may br accomplished by barring only the interest 
of the negligent spouse or his estate. 
"l\T r. Flores died in the same accident in which his wife 
was injurrd. 'I'o allow her to recover for her personal in-
juries will in no way enrich Mr. Flores m· those who might 
lake through him . ... 
'' VVhen thP husband is dead, not only is the reason for 
the rule imputing his negligence to his wife gone, but to 
apply it defpats its own purpose. It is but a windfall to a 
defendant who nPgligently injures a wife or causes the deatl1 
of a minor child that recovery may be barred because the 
wife's husband was also negligent. Although allowing the 
negligent dt>fendant to escape liability has been considered 
a lesser evil than allo•ving the negligent spouse to profit from 
his own wrong. surely the former evil may not be balanced by 
the lattrr 1vhen the latter is no longer present." (Emphasis 
added; Flores v. Brown, supm, 39 Cal.2d 622, 631-632.) 
The cause of action for personal injuries, or death, arises 
at the time of the aeciLlent. rt bas heen held that a cause of 
action for personal injuries of either a husband or wife 
is community property. Mrs. Flores' cause of action for 
ber own personal injuries was, therefore, community prop-
Prty beeausr it arose at the time of the accident in which her 
husband was killed. The marriage was not dissolved by 
death pTiot to the timf' the cause of action arose! Any 
damages rer•oyerable are so only beeause of the eause of action. 
Had it uot been for the cause of aetion there would have been 
no recovery. If the eause of action is community property, 
thn1 the reeoYery must also be eomrnunity property inasmueh 
as this court has held that a relinquishment after the cause 
KESLER V. pABST 
[43 C.2d 254; 273 P,2d 257] 
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of action has arisen is ineffectual! To hold that Mr. Flores' 
death, after the cause of action arose, was sufficient to release 
to Mrs. Flores any recovery for her personal injuries but 
points out the factual similarity between the two cases and 
the illogical dissimilarity in the holdings. To be sure, Mr. 
Flores could not actually spend the money recovered by 
Mrs. Flores, but through his death he enabled his widow to 
receive a benefit she would not otherwise have had because 
of his contributory negligence. By his death, he created 
in her an ''enforceable right . . . that did not theretofore 
exist" and "in fact" profited by his own wrong! The ma-
jority, however, finds no unjust enrichment in the Flores 
case and, in so finding, permits an event occurring after the 
cause of action arosP to change the character of the cause of 
action. In this case \Ye find no such "permission" and the 
injured spouse is barred because her negligent spouse might 
profit from any recovery even though he has voluntarily 
relinquished any and all interest he might have in that 
recovery. 
Other states with identical statutes have reasoned the 
matter out logically and have concluded that personal injuries 
reqnire personal compensation. In Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 
N.M. 483 [245 P.2d 826], two questions were raised. The 
first was whether a married woman in New Mexico had 
the right to prosecute in her own name a cause of action 
against one who negligently inflicted bodily injuries upon 
her; and the second was whether the proceeds of a judgment 
on account of such injuries belonged to the wife as her 
srparate property or were an asset of the community of herself 
and husband. The definition of what constitutes separate 
property of either spouse is identical to that pertaining in 
California (Civ. Code, §§ 162, 163), as is the definition of 
that which constitutes community property (Civ. Code,§ 164). 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in an opinion written 
by the able and learned Chief ,Justice James B. McGhee, held 
that a married woman so injured had the right to prosecute 
in her own name a cause of action against one who negligently 
injured her, and that the proceeds of any judgment recovered 
hy her would be her sole and separate property. 
In Soto v. Vandeventer, supra, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McGhee, has this so say: 
"\V e are of the opinion that reason, justice and a fair 
interpretation of our community statute, construed either 
in the light of the common or Spanish law, require that wr 
our notice. 
''Under the 
horse she had 
motor vehicle "'"" ""'~'" 
cause of 
to the 
her would to 
receive one half of the 
if the wife were a 
and some driver of a 
action for the 
but that for the injury to 
and the husband would 
a In addition, 
the husband refuse to bring suit for the 
injuries the wife bad sustained. \Ve decline to adopt such 
a rule in New Mexico. 
''The cause of action for the to the community 
for medical expenses, loss of services to the community, as well 
as loss of if any, of the wife still belongs to the 
community, and the husband as its head is the proper party 
to bring such an action one who wrongfully injures 
the wife.'' 
Nevada also holds that for a personal injury 
belongs to the person Fredrickson v. Watson 
Canst. Co. v. 60 Xev. 117 [J02 P.2d 627, 628].) In 
the Fredrickson ease, court said that " [ i] n fixing the 
classification of the from compensation for 
a personal injury to the y;ife in this case, it seems unnecessary 
to discuss the refinements invo1Yed in the question of whether 
a chose in action for a tort is for the reason that 
the judgment and 
be property, and the 
right 1!iolated, . the 
phasis added.) 
It should also be noted that Orrin K. lVIcl\:furray, former 
Dean of the UniYersity of Cali-
fornia, calls the doctrine of recovery 
for personal "utter nonsense" (2 
Cal.hRev. 161, 162). In an article Green, "The Texas 
Death Act," 26 Texas L. Rev. the doctrine is strongly 
DuNN v. PACIFIC GAs & Er"ECTRIC Co. 265 
[ 43 C.2d 265; 272 P.2d 7451 
ec1.), section 
from the wife the cause of action 
her of personal security, 
v•;as not intended to do." Mr. 
also states that the to personal security is 
individual and cannot be held in common with another. Mr. 
DeF'uniak of § feels 
that the to the person is intended to 
or make whole the and that the compensation 
of the same character as that which has been injured 
suffered loss. 
A of this court refuses to construe section 171c 
of the Civil Corle which was added in 1951 after the decision 
in the Zaragosa case because the cause of action here involved 
arose before that time. It is opinion now, as it was at the 
time the Zaragosa case was that no such addition to 
the Code was necessary in order to enable the wife to hold 
any recovery for her personal injuries as her sole and separate 
property. It will be interesting indeed to see how section 
171c will be interpreted by this court when the occasion 
• f anses. 
I would reverse the judgment and order appealed from. 
F. No. 18975. In Bank. July 20, 1954.] 
DOLOHES DUNN, as Special Administratrix, etc., Appellant, 
v. P£\CIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (a 
Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Dismissal-Judgment or Order Ineffectual-Nonsuit. 
-Order motions for judgment of nonsuit, not having 
been entered in minutes prior to entry of written judgment of 
nonsuit, is ineffective and a purported appeal therefrom will 
be dismissed. 
[2] Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.-A motion for 
nonsuit may properly be granted only when, disregarding 
conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff's evidence all the value 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and K onsuit, § 48; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Konsuit, § 42. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 912.5; [2) Dis-
missal,§ 75; [3] Electricity,§ 3; [4, 7] Electricity,§ 17; [5) Elec-
tricity, §21(2); [6] Electricity, §16; [8] Easements, §35; [9] 
Electricity, § 21; [10-12] Electricity, § 31. 
